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The Case Against Insider Trading: A
Response to Professor Manne
By David Ferber*
Professor Manne's article appears to be largely an attack on
critics of his book Insider Trading and the Stock Market. I must
confess I have not read his book. I did, however, read an earlier article
by Professor Manne attacking the position of the Commission in the
Texas Gulf case, and I once participated in a forum at which Professor
Manne expressed his view that inside information should be something
that a corporate official might sell.
I disagree with Professor Manne's basic position that "[t]he
debatable aspects of insider trading are capable of resolution through
tools of economic analysis,"' as well as his "downgrading of morals."
With respect to the latter, many, if not most, laws on the books are
based on concepts of morality. As I understand the Securities
Exchange Act, its aim of preventing manipulative, deceptive, and
fraudulent conduct in securities transactions was largely because of the
congressional view that these activities were immoral. Under the
securities laws Congress sought to have the securities markets honestly
conducted.
Congress assumed that honest conduct of the markets would be
good for the country economically. The Commission has accepted this
view. It is probably not susceptible to proof one way or another, except
that, in the light of revelations of what had occurred in the twenties,
the extent to which investors would have gone back into the markets
may be questioned had they not thought that many of the manipulative
devices then used had now been made illegal.
Professor Manne's basic quarrel appears to be with the "full
disclosure" approach of the Securities Act. 2 He appears to suggest that
should investments in a particular business be made only if the
investors were lied to, it would be justifiable to obtain money for the
business through such lies, at least if the financing of such a business
*
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might be important to the economy. Professor Manne seems to think
that the Commission's concern with conserving investor confidence is
motivated largely by the desire to increase the profits of brokers.' This
necessarily implies that a loss of investor confidence does no harm to
anybody except brokers who lose commissions. Those who lived
through the 1929 crash and its aftermath will not share that view.
Wholly apart from the long-term results of a policy based solely on
economics, it assumes a disregard of the rights of individuals because
of an assumed "important economic benefit to the country"-a
totalitarian philosophy with which I cannot agree. Certainly Congress
has not accepted such a philosophy in its adoption of the securities
laws.
Since I believe Congress was attempting to improve the morality
of the marketplace, I think that the economic effect is largely
irrelevant-at least in the absence of indications showing dire
happenings to public investors or the" market generally.
Professor Manne's suggestion that the Commission's enforcement
action against Texas Gulf is an illustration of the "pushy way of
federal regulatory agencies" would presumably be equally true of the
Commission's position in the Capital Gains Research Bureau' case. In

this case the Supreme Court held that the Commission properly
determined that the publisher of an investment advisory service had
violated the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act in
purchasing securities he was about to recommend and selling them
after his recommendation to his clients had raised the market price.'
He could similarly describe the Commission's position that in
appropriate circumstances the securities laws are applicable to interests
in oil lands, rows of fruit trees, and savings and loan deposits.'
Accordingly, Professor Manne is not disagreeing solely with the
Commission but also with the Supreme Court.
So far as I am aware, the Commission has never defended its
position in Texas Gulf by urging that the information of insiders "is
the 'property' of the shareholders". The Commission's position has
been simply that it was deceptive for an insider to purchase securities
of a stockholder when the insider had important information that the
3. Id. at 578.
4. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
5. Id.
6. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
7. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d
883 (2d Cir. 1968).
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stockholder could not know about-a position taken years ago by the
Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide Professor Manne suggests that
shareholders are not injured by insider trading. In one sense this may
be so-the purchase by an insider, as distinguished from anyone else,
does not adversely affect the price received by the selling stockholder;
indeed, the fact that insiders are adding to the demand would tend to
enhance the price. But this should not be the test.9 Viewed otherwise,
the shareholder is hurt if, when needing cash, and attempting to
determine which of his securities to sell, he is injured by determining
to sell one which has great potential value of which he is not informed.
This is particularly true if the insiders would have generally advised the
public of this value but for the incentive of continuing to make
purchases before the potential values are made public.
It is true, as Professor Manne points out, that declaring insider
trading to be unlawful does not assure early disclosure. But if insiders
were permitted to profit from inside information, there would be a
natural tendency for insiders to prolong the period prior to disclosure.
Moreover, the fact that trading on inside information is unlawful tends
to encourage early disclosure, since disclosure is the best way a
corporation has of preventing such trading by its officials and
employees. Violations by such persons presumably would have a
negative effect on the good will of the corporation.
I do not think the Commission has ever suggested that the
prevention of insider trading was the perfect solution to problems of
timely disclosure, and I agree with Professor Manne that
"[e]nforcement" is necessarily "imperfect at best." This is true,
however, of all areas of law enforcement. It is hardly a reason,
however, to eliminate such enforcement. Even though some persons will
necessarily get away with trading on the basis of inside information,
just as undoubtedly the Commission is unable to catch up with all
persons who sell securities through fraudulent means, the fact that the
Commission is able to enforce the law against some violators
necessarily discourages many other would-be violators.
There are also persons who as a matter of principle would not take
steps in violation of the law, even though the possible immorality of
such activities would not discourage their participation if they were not
8. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
9. In the Capital Gains case, for example, presumably no one was hurt by following the
recommendation of the adviser. 375 U.S. at 180. Nor would anyone usually be hurt if a SEC
employee traded in the stock of a company in which his work involved him. I question whether
even Professor Manne would contend that the rule prohibiting such trading by a Commission
employee is not wise.
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unlawful. 0 Certainly Professor Manne's diatribe against laws that
cannot be fully enforced would apply equally to all antifraud
provisions, and, to my knowledge, it has never been suggested that for
this reason such provisions should not be in the law.
It has long been recognized that while it is healthy for corporate
officials to own stock in their corporation, there are problems of
possible conflict of interest in unlimited trading in that stock by such
officials. This is particularly so during the reorganization of a
corporation. In that situation the Supreme Court has stated:
Access to inside information or strategic position in a corporate
reorganization renders the temptation to profit by trading in the Debtor's stock

particularly pernicious. The particular dangers may take two forms: On the one
hand, an insider is in a position to conceal from other stockholders vital

information concerning the Debtor's financial condition or prospects, which may
affect the value of its securities, until after he has reaped a private profit from

the use of that information. On the other hand, one who exercises control over a
reorganization holds a post which might tempt him to affect or influence
corporate policies-even the shaping of the very plan of reorganization-for the

benefit of his own security holdings but to the detriment of the Debtor's interests
and those of its creditors and other interested groups."

In recognition of these problems, Congress in Section 249 of the
Bankruptcy Act, provided generally that "[n]o compensation or
reimbursement shall be allowed to any committee or attorney, or other
person acting in the [reorganization] proceedings in a representative or
fiduciary capacity who at any time after assuming to act in such
capacity has purchased or sold such claims or stock" of the debtor.
Similarly, Section 212 authorizes the judge to limit any participation
on claims or stock acquired by certain persons in a fiduciary capacity
"to the actual consideration paid therefor.' 1 3 A similar holding has
been upheld in a reorganization under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act. 4 Even absent a reorganization, the problems of possible
conflict, may exist to some extent whenever there is trading by
corporate officials. Accordingly, Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act makes corporate officials and certain insiders liable for
their profits from trading in their corporation's securities within a sixmonth period." The Commission's position in the Texas Gulf case in
this regard was, in effect, that whenever a conflict can be shown
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Professor Manne seemingly concedes this point. Manne, supra note i, at 554.
Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 642 (1963).
I1U.S.C. § 649 (1964).
Id. § 612.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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between an insider and the corporation's security holders by reason of
the insider's trading, the insider should not be permitted to benefit.
Professor Manne's economic analysis seems to be based on an
extraordinarily broad definition of insider trading. Essentially he seems
to refer to any situation in which there is an inequality in the
information possessed by the parties to a trade. 6 The Commission has
not adopted any such definition. It could not stop such trading if it
wanted to and I doubt that it would if it could, essentially for the
reasons stated by Professor Manne. Consequently, his criticism of the
inadequacy of the Commission's enforcement is based on its failure to
do something which it has never tried to do. The Commission has
objected only where the person taking advantage of information owes
a duty of loyalty to the person he is trading with and is breaching that
duty or where some type of aiding and abetting in such a breach of
trust occurs. The principle that a fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty to
his beneficiary is firmly imbedded in the law and is not dependent on
economic efficiency. As Judge Cardozo has long since pointed out, a
fiduciary is "held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace" and "the level of conduct for fiduciaries [has] been kept
at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.' 7 Thus, if a real
estate broker knows that a piece of land is far more valuable than is
generally realized and has no other relationships, he can proceed to buy
that land and economic efficiency may be furthered. If, however, he has
been employed to buy the land for a client, he cannot buy it for a
nominee of his, resell it to his client, and split the profits, whatever the
economic advantages of this course of action might be.
Professor Manne states that he has no great quarrel with Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 8 which was a specific attempt
of Congress to counter trading on inside information. He states that
the reason he does not quarrel with this provision is that he does not
believe it is "effective to counter the most significant form of insider
trading." This appears somewhat inconsistent with his argument a few
pages earlier that the only good laws are the ones that can fully
accomplish their purpose. If, as Professor Manne concedes, Section
16(b) "might possibly serve to prevent some manipulation in stock by
statutory insiders," it seems to me that the Commission's position in
the Texas Gulf and Cady Roberts9 cases would do the same.
16. Manne, supra note 1, at 562.
17. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
18. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
19. Manne, supranote 1, at 556 n.29.
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Professor Manne seems to assume that the Securities and
Exchange Commission can never do anything right. Instead of praising
it for being flexible when it has been convinced that certain accounting
procedures that have gone on for years should not be necessarily
applicable in all situations, 2° he criticizes it for changing its rules in
mid-stream. No agency knows everything from the first day but
necessarily learns from its experience.
Professor Manne's comment that law professors and others who
have worked with the Securities and Exchange Commission have "a
firm and unwavering conviction that what the SEC says is right" is
perhaps the highest form of praise that a government agency could
hope to obtain. I wish it were so. But it is true that the Commission's
alumni both in the academic and business world do tend generally to
respect positions taken by the Commission. This is flattering because,
having been inside the agency, they are more aware than others of the
problems faced and they are sufficiently sophisticated to be
knowledgeable if Commission decisions were based on improper
considerations.2 1 They presumably also know many of the personnel
involved intimately and are in a position to assess the fairness and
2
conscientiousness of these officials *
I have not attempted to coyer everything in Professor Manne's
article. For example, the relationship of igsider trading to
pornography, marijuana and prosiftution is not clea'r to mep Nor do
I understand his comparison of profits from" insider trading with the
contingent fees of lawyers.2 In the later situation the lawyer is paid for
his services by contract with his client upon the basis of his success for
the client-a better comparison might be to a lawyer who settles a case
by taking a fee under the table from the other side. Nor do I comment
20. Id. at n.71.
21. The suggestion of Professor Manne that individuals who illegally profit on the basis of
inside information will somehow gain strong influence with the Commission is simply at odds
with the 36 years of the Commission's history.

22.

Professor Schotland was not an employee of the Commission at the time he wrote his

article and has never been employed in the Commission's enforcement activities. There is no basis
whatsoever for Professor Manne to claim that the Commission "appears to admit the utilization
of an extraordinary police state technique" in connection with its investigation in the Texas Gulf
case. Despite Professor Manne's suggestion, the Commission has always made it a policy to
prohibit wiretapping in the course of its investigations and to advise all witnesses of their
constitutional rights. In the Texas Gulf case, the record shows how certain persons in Washington
received their inside information-through Mr. Darke. The SEC could have learned by asking
them whether these persons traded through a Washington broker.
23. Manne, supra note I, at 578 n.92.

24. Id. at 579.

